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PATENTS--Owner of Process Patent Not Guilty of Misuse When
He Conditions Authorization to Use the Patented Process on
Purchase of an Unpatented Nonstaple Material Used in the
Process. Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 100 S.
Ct. 2601 (1980).
In Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co.,' a divided
2
United States Supreme Court construed Section 271 of the Patent
Act of 19521 to permit the owner of a method patent4 to exercise
exclusive control over an unpatented nonstaple5 article used in the
patented method. The Court held that under Section 271,6 the
method patent owner is not guilty of patent misuse7 if he sells the
1. 100 S. Ct. 2601 (1980).
2. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist. Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall and Stevens, filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Stevens also wrote a dissenting opinion.
Id
3. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1976).
4. An invention may be patented only if it falls within one of the statutory classes of
subject matter. Section 101 of the Patent Act provides, inter alia, "Whoever invents or discov-
ers any new and usefulprocess . . . may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (emphasis added).
"The term 'process' means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter or material." 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1976).
See, e.g., Rouhm and Haas Co. v. Roberts Chemicals, 245 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1957) (court af-
firmed claims for a process to control fungus growth using an old fungicidal composition).
5. The Court used the term "nonstaple" as a shorthand reference to a component used
in a patented process as defined in 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1976). 100 S. Ct. at 2608 n.6. For text
of § 27 1(c), see note 6 infra.
6. Section 271 of the Patent Act provides,
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes,
uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the
patent therefor, infringes the patent.
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an in-
fringer.
(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combina-
tion or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented pro-
cess, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be
liable as a contributory infringer.
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the follow-
ing: (1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without his consent
would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized
another to perform acts which if performed without his consent would constitute con-
tributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against
infringement or contributory infringement.
35 U.S.C. § 271 (1976).
7. The patent owner misuses his patent if he exploits it in an improper way, either by
unpatented nonstaple article, conditions permission to use the pat-
ented method on purchase of the unpatented nonstaple, and then
enforces his patent rights by suing others for contributory infringe-
ment.' In finding a clear legislative intent to overturn the results of
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co. 9 and Mercoid Corp.
v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 'o the majority held that
Congress had untangled the conflict between contributory infringe-
ment and patent misuse by carving out an area in which the patent
owner may exercise control over unpatented articles that meet the
requirements of Section 271(c)." The decision revitalizes the doc-
trine of contributory infringement, whose very existence as a weapon
of patent enforcement was left in doubt by the Mercoid decisions.'2
Respondent Rohm and Haas was the owner of a method pat-
ent'3 for applying propanil, 14 an unpatented chemical compound,'
5
to inhibit the growth of undesirable plants among established crops.
Those who purchased propanil from Rohm and Haas obtained an
implied license to use it in the patented process.I6 Petitioners manu-
factured propanil and marketed the chemical in containers on which
were printed directions for practicing the patented process. Respon-
dent brought suit in the Federal District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas '7 seeking injunctive relief against petitioners, whose
violating the antitrust laws or by extending the patent monopoly beyond its lawful scope. 4 D.
CHISUM, PATENTS § 19.04 (1980). See also A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 518
(2d ed. 1972).
8. A party who assists another to infringe a patent, as defined in § 271(a), is a contribu-
tory infringer. Section 271(c) prohibits the type of contributory infringement in which the
contributory infringer, without authorization, sells a component of a patented product or pro-
cess that constitutes a material part of the invention and has no substantial noninfringing use.
See note 6 supra.
9. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
10. 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
1I. See note 6 supra.
12. See notes 9, 10 and accompanying text supra.
13. Patent No. 3,816,092 (the Wilson patent) was issued by the United States Patent Of-
fice on June II, 1974. 100 S. Ct. at 2606. The following patent claim is illustrative:
1. A method for selectively inhibiting growth of undesirable plants in an area
containing growing undesirable plants in an established crop, which comprises apply-
ing to said area, 3,4 - dichloropropionanilide at a rate of application which inhibits
growth of said undesirable plants and which does not adversely affect the growth of
said established crop.
100 S. Ct. at 2606 n.2.
14. Propanil is a chemical compound whose scientific name is 3,4 - dichloropropion-
anilide. 100 S. Ct. at 2605.
15. A patent on propanil was declared invalid when Monsanto Co. sought to enforce it
against Rohm and Haas by suing for direct infringement. Monsanto Co. v. Rohm and Haas
Co., 312 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 456 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1972), cerl. denied, 407 U.S.
934 (1972). The district court found that propanil had been implicitly revealed in the prior art
and therefore was unpatentable. Id at 787-90.
16. The sale of an unpatented commodity with no use beyond the patented combination
or process implies a license to use, sell, or manufacture the patented combination or process. I
H. EINHORN, PATENT LICENSING TRANSACTIONS § 1.03[21 (1978) (citing United States v. Uni-
vis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942)).
17. 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 691 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
sales of propanil allegedly interfered with respondent's rights under
the method patent.
Petitioners subsequently requested licenses to practice the pat-
ented process, and raised the defense of patent misuse when Rohm
and Haas refused to grant any express licenses. The district court
granted summary judgment for petitioners on the issue of misuse18
because Rohm and Haas' refusal to grant licenses other than those
implied from the purchase of propanil constituted a tying arrange-
ment, 9 which is an illegal extension of the patent monopoly.2" The
court reasoned that such conduct would have been patent misuse
under the judicial decisions preceding the enactment of Section
271(d), and nothing in the language or legislative history of Section
271 would alter such a result.2 '
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.22 After ex-
amining the legislative history of Section 271, the court concluded
that by specifying exceptions to patent misuse, Congress clearly in-
tended to protect the right of the patent owner "to exclude others
and reserve to itself, if it chooses, the right to sell nonstaples used-
substantially only in its invention. ' 23 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari 24 "to forestall a possible conflict in the lower courts25 and
to resolve an issue of prime importance in the administration of the
patent law."
26
The issue before the Court was whether the owner of a chemical
process patent is guilty of misuse and, therefore, barred from enforc-
ing its patent rights against contributory infringement when the own-
er exploits the patent only in conjunction with an unpatented
commodity that constitutes a material part of the invention and that
is capable of no substantial use outside the scope of the patented
process.27 To resolve the issue, the Court proceeded to review the
judicial history of contributory infringement and patent misuse lead-
ing up to the enactment of Section 271.28
18. Id. at 694-95.
19. A tying arrangement is a restriction in a patent license on the use of unpatented
materials and supplies in patented products or processes. 4 D. CHISUM, supra note 7, at
§ 17.0214]. See also A. DELLER, supra note 7, at § 660.
20. A. DELLER, supra note 7, at § 660.
21. 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 701-08.
22. 599 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1979).
23. Id at 704.
24. 444 U.S. 1012 (1980).
25. See note 78 and accompanying text infrla
26. 100 S. Ct. at 2607.
27. Id at 2604. The validity of respondent's method patent was not an issue before the
Court. Furthermore, even though petitioners conceded that they committed the tort of con-
tributory infringement in selling propanil with instructions for use in the patented process,
they raised the defense of patent misuse, thus making the key issue whether a patent misuse
had occurred. Id at 2608.
28. The doctrines of contributory infringement and patent misuse were judicially devel-
oped rules of equity. Contributory infringement was initially an outgrowth of the common-
The doctrine of contributory infringement had its genesis in the
Connecticut case of Wallace v. Holmes. 29 Although a competitor
sold only the newly invented component of plaintiffs combination
patent, the court held that the competitor infringed upon the paten-
tee's rights because purchasers of the competitor's product would un-
doubtedly complete the patented combination, resulting in a direct
infringement.3" The Supreme Court of the United States first recog-
nized the doctrine of contributory infringement in Morgan Envelope
Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 3 l but refused to apply
it to hold liable a supplier of perishable goods that were used in the
patented invention.32 Full acceptance by the Supreme Court oc-
cuffed in Leeds and Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 33 in
which the Court upheld an injunction against the seller of an unpat-
ented component specially designed for use in the patented combina-
tion.34 Contributory infringement continued to be relied upon as a
means of enforcing patent rights,35 and received its broadest applica-
law doctrine of joint tortfeasors. See Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871).
Patent misuse was developed as a specific application of the unclean hands doctrine to deny a
remedy to the patent owner whose own conduct disqualified him from receiving an equitable
remedy for an infringement of his patent rights. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,
314 U.S. 488 (1942). Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952 provided the first codification of the
doctrines of contributory infringement and patent misuse. See note 6 supra.
29. 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871).
30. The facts of Wallace provide an excellent illustration of the doctrine of contributory
infringement. The patentee had invented a new burner for oil lamps, and the invention was
patented as a combination that included the standard components of an oil lamp. A competi-
tor marketed a rival lamp that included the patented burner but lacked the chimney, a stan-
dard lamp component. Such conduct was not a direct infringement because the competitor did
not sell the entire patented combination. 29 F. Cas. at 79. Nevertheless, the court found an
interference with the patent owner's rights because the purchasers would add the chimney,
thus completing the infringement. Accordingly, the court allowed the patentee to recover from
the competitor, rather than forcing the patentee to sue individually the purchasers of the com-
peting lamp.
31. 152 U.S. 425 (1894).
32. Id at 433. Morgan Envelope involved a patented combination including a toilet pa-
per roll and a dispensing device. The Court held that toilet paper rolls were perishable, i.e.,
staple, articles of commerce and, therefore, defendant's sale of such toilet paper rolls was not a
contributory infringement. Id.
33. 213 U.S. 325 (1909). Holding a patent on a combination disc record and stylus, the
patentee sought to enjoin Leeds and Catlin Co. from selling disc records to be used in the
patented combination. Id at 330-31.
34. Id. at 337. The Court distinguished Morgan Envelope, holding that the record discs
were not perishable and comprised an integral part of the invention. The Court stated that
under the license granted to the purchasers of the patented combination, disc records could not
be obtained from a source other than the patentee. Id at 336. Thus, the patent owner was
granted monopoly control over an unpatented nonstaple article of commerce, viz. the record
discs.
35. See, e.g., James Heekin v. Baker, 138 F. 63 (8th Cir. 1905); Weed Chain Tire Grip
Co. v. Cleveland Chain & Mfg. Co., 196 F. 213 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1910). Cf. Cortelyou v. John-
son & Co., 207 U.S. 196 (1907) (no contributory infringement by one who, without knowledge
of a license restriction requiring purchase of all ink from the patentee, sold ink to licensees of
plaintiffs patented printing machine); Edison Elec. Light Co. v. Peninsular Light, Power &
Heat Co., 101 F. 831 (6th Cir. 1900) (no contributory infringement by one who furnishes elec-
tricity to user of an infringing electrical system because electricity has many noninfringing
uses).
tion in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co. 36 In 1917, however, the Court in Mo-
tion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 37 invalidated an
attempt by the patentee to condition use of a patented machine on
exclusive use of unpatented supplies. The decision overruled A.B.
Dick Co., 38 and for the first time, the Court scrutinized the conduct
of the patent owner to dismiss a suit for contributory infringement.
Although the term "patent misuse" was not adopted, such con-
duct was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Carbice Corp. of
America v. American Patents Dev. Corp. 39 The Court continued to
apply the misuse doctrine to deny relief to patent owners who at-
tempted to exercise control over unpatented articles of commerce,
40
but none of these decisions were explicitly based upon the type of
product sold by the contributory infringer. Clearly, however, the
cases denying relief to the patentee involved unpatented staple
goods.4' Then, in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co. 
42
and Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 43 the
Supreme Court extended the misuse doctrine to prohibit a patentee
from exercising control over an unpatented non-staple device that
36. 224 U.S. I (1912). The case involved essentially the same situation as Coreyou, see
note 35 supra. In AB. Dick, however, defendant had knowledge of the license restriction and
was held liable as a contributory infringer.
37. 243 U.S. 502 (1917). The owner of a patent on motion picture projectors attempted
to condition use of a projector on exclusive use of its film. Id at 506-08.
38. Id at 518. Not only did the Supreme Court respond to the expanding doctrine of
contributory infringement with a new tougher attitude, see note 37 and accompanying text
supra and notes 39-45 and accompanying text infra, but Congress also reacted by enacting § 3
of the Clayton Act, which provides,
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to . . . make a
sale . . . of goods . . . whether patented or unpatented, for use . . . on the condi-
tion. . . that the. . . purchaser thereof shall not use. . . the goods. . . of a compet-
itor . . . where the effect of such . . . sale . . . may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
Patent misuse should not be confused with an antitrust violation. In Dawson, the
Supreme Court was addressing only the issue of patent misuse. 100 S. Ct. at 2607 n.3.
39. 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
[The patent owner] may not exact as the condition of a license that unpatented
materials used in connection with the invention shall be purchased only from the
licensor; and if he does so, relief against one who supplies such unpatented materials
will be denied.
Id at 31. The Court distinguished the facts of Carbice, in which the owner of a patent on a
refrigeration package authorized its use only to those who purchased dry ice from its exclusive
licensee, from those of Leeds and Catlin. Id at 34. The Court characterized dry ice as a staple
article. Id. at 29.
40. See, e.g., B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942) (patentee authorized use of
its patented process only to those who purchased patentee's rubber cement); Morton Salt Co. v.
G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (patentee attempted to restrict purchase of salt tablets
for use in its patented dispensing machine); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938)
(patentee sued a competitor who was selling unpatented bituminous emulsion for use in paten-
tee's patented road surface curing process).
41. E.g., rubber cement, salt tablets, and bituminous emulsion are staple articles of com-
merce. See note 40 supra.
42. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
43. 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
was a material part of the patented structure.44 The decisions over-
ruled Leeds and Catlin and substantially limited the doctrine of con-
tributory infringement.45 Moreover, because the results reached by
the Court appeared to eliminate the doctrine of contributory in-
fringement, the Mercoid decisions generated dismay among legal
scholars and confusion in the lower courts.46 With the impetus of
certain segments of the patent bar, Congress finally codified the doc-
trines of contributory infringement and patent misuse in 1952.47
The language of Section 271 (c) indicates the adoption of a care-
fully circumscribed definition of contributory infringement that
eliminates staple goods from its scope.48 Section 271 (c) further nar-
rows the character of nonstaples, the result being a definition of con-
tributory infringement that excludes from its scope the sale of
common articles of commerce.49 Clearly, the stoker switches in Mer-
cold and the propanil in Dawson are both nonstaples within the lan-
guage of Section 271(c). ° The focus in both cases, however, is on
whether the patentee's conduct constitutes misuse of the patent.
Based upon a casual reading of Section 27 1(d), Rohm and Haas'
conduct appears to be excluded from patent misuse.51 Respondent
derived revenue from the sale of propanil, authorized others to use
its patented process, and sought to enforce its patent rights against
contributory infringers. Although the statute clearly states that a
patentee may do "one or more" of these three acts, 52 petitioners ar-
gued that the combination of two of the protected activities in a sin-
gle transaction was not expressly protected by Section 271(d). 3
44. Both Mercoid cases involved the same fact situation. The patentee held a combina-
tion patent on a heating system that included unpatented stoker switches, a nonstaple. 320
U.S. at 664.
45. 320 U.S. at 669.
46. Following the Mercoid cases, the lower courts were unsure what remained of the
doctrine of contributory infringement. See, e.g., Stroco Products, Inc. v. Mullenbach, 67
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 168 (S.D. Cal. 1944), in which the court held that the mere filing of an action
for contributory infringement may be evidence of patent misuse when the effect of the suit is to
deter competition in unpatented articles. Id at 170.
47. Patent'Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 811 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1976)).
48. See note 6 supra.
49. Id
50. See note 68 infra.
51. See note 6 supra.
52. Under Section 271(d)(1), the patent owner may sell unpatented nonstaples because
under 271 [c], such conduct by an authorized party would constitute contributory infringement.
Purchasers of propanil from Rohm and Haas receive an implied license to practice the pat-
ented process. Such behavior is protected by Section 271 (d)(2). Finally, the suit by Rohm and
Haas to enforce its patent rights against contributory infringement is not misuse under Section
271(d) (3). See note 6 supra. See generally Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent
Act of 1952, 21 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 521 (1953); Scafetta, Ten Years AfterAro II: The Effect of
Patent Section 271 on the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 58 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 69 (1976); Whale, The
ABCD's of Patent Infringement, 62 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 136 (1980). Cf. Note, Contributory
Infringement and Misuse - The Effect of Section 271 ofthe Patent Act of 1952, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 909 (1962) (concluding that the language of § 27 1(d) does not compel this result).
53. 100 S. Ct. at 2616.
They also maintained that the purpose of the Patent Act of 1952 was
to do no more than clarify and codify the existing case law.54 The
majority, however, found a broader intent in the legislative history.
The title "An act to revise and codify the patent laws . .. "
suggests a purpose beyond mere codification, and the particular im-
portance of Section 271 was noted in the committee reports.5 6 Be-
cause specific information was sparse in both the committee reports
and floor debates, 57 the Court looked to the hearings of 194 8,
58
1949, 59 and 1951,60 which resulted in final enactment of the Patent
Act of 1952.61 In each of these hearings, abundant testimony indi-
cated an intent to overturn the Mercoid result. 62 The testimony in
1949 revealed that the misuse doctrine as applied in Mercoid had
destroyed the doctrine of contributory infringement, and the only
way to revive it was to make exceptions to the misuse doctrine.
63
The proposed exceptions would reverse the result in Mercoid, but
not that in Carbice. 64 The purpose of re-establishing contributory
infringement by delineating exceptions to the misuse doctrine was
also confirmed in the 1951 hearings, when it was stated that the ex-
ceptions to misuse, enumerated in Section 271 were necessitated by
recent Supreme Court decisions.65  Testimony further implied that
section 271(d) would protect the patentee who attempts to exercise
control over unpatented nonstaple articles through the use of a pat-
ent.66
54. Id
55. Patent Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1976)).
56. HR. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952), states that "[one of the] major
changes or innovations in the title consist[s] of. . . the judicial doctrine of contributory in-
fringement in § 271." Id (emphasis added).
57. 100 S. Ct. at 2616.
58. Contributory Infringement in Patents, Definition of Invention.- Hearings on HR. 5988,
HR. 4061, and HR. 5248 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. (1948) [hereinafter cited as 1948 Hear-
ings].
59. Contributory Infringement.- Hearings on HR. 3866 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) [hereinafter cited as 1949 Hear-
ings].
60. Patent Codification and Revision." Hearings on HR 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. (1951) [hereinafter cited as 1951 Hear-
ings 1.
61. The Court regarded all the hearings as important because the legislation had re-
mained basically unchanged from the earlier versions through final enactment. 100 S. Ct,
2617. See Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 336 U.S. 601, 605-06 n.6
(1949).
62. Much of the testimony was that of the chief draftsman of Section 271, Mr. Giles S.
Rich. See notes 63-66 infra. See generally Rich, supra note 52.
63. 1949 Hearings, supra note 59, at 13-14, 67 (statement of Giles S. Rich).
64. Mr. Rich stated that "[tihe exception which we wish to make to the misuse doctrine
would reverse the result in the Mercoid case; it would not reverse the result in the Carbice
case." 1949 Hearings, supra note 59, at 67 (statement of Giles S. Rich).
65. 1951 Hearings, supra note 60, at 161 (statement of Giles S. Rich).
66. The following exchange between Rep. Crumpacker and Mr. Rich demonstrates the
protection afforded patentees who attempt to exercise control over unpatented nonstaple arti-
cles through the use of a patent:
In total, the legislative history clearly demonstrates an expan-
sion of the statutory protection granted to patentees. "[Bly enacting
[Sections] 27 1(c) and (d), Congress granted patent holders a statutory
right to control nonstaple goods that are capable only of infringing
use in a patented invention .... "67 The Dawson Court found that
respondent's sale of the nonstaple propanil was essentially the very
conduct condemned in the Mercoid decisions.68 Since the legislative
history revealed that Section 271(d) was designed to withdraw from
the Mercoid result, the Court concluded that respondent's conduct
fell within the protective scope of Section 271(d).6 9
The Court next answered petitioners' argument that Rohm and
Haas' refusal to license competitors to sell propanil was a course of
conduct outside Section 271(d). The majority stated that Section
271(d) permits licensing but does not require it. 7° Second, the legis-
lative history did not indicate that offering a license to an alleged
contributory infringer was a determinative factor in convincing Con-
gress to retreat from the Mercoid cases. 7' Finally, the Court noted
the rarity of compulsory licensing in the American patent system.72
The foundation of the patent right is to exclude others from profiting
by the patented invention,73 and compulsory licensing defeats this
Mr. Crumpacker: As you interpret this [§ 271(d)] as it now reads, would it in
any way prevent a court from holding the monopolistic practices referred to as being
a misuse of a patent? That is, where a patentee had actually been engaged in trying
to gain a limited monopoly of unpatented [staple] articles through the use of the
patent.
Mr. Rich: If we assume that staples are excluded from [§ 271(c)]?
Mr. Crumpacker: Yes.
Mr. Rich: The answer is that (d) would not prevent their being held, the acts
being held to be misuse.
1951 Hearings, supra note 60, at 173-74.
67. 100 S. Ct. 2621-22.
68. In Dawson, respondent licensed others to use its patented process only in conjunction
with purchases of respondent's propanil. In Mercoid, the patentee also conditioned licensing
on the purchase of its unpatented stoker switches. Both the propanil and stoker switches were
nonstaple articles, and both were integral parts of the invention having no substantial nonin-
fringing use. Id at 2622.
69. Id
70. Id The 1948 Hearings indicate that § 27 1(d)(2) gives the patentee an option to li-
cense or not to license:
A man can either say, "you cannot sell the part of my invention to somebody
else to complete it," or he can say, "yes, you can sell the part of my invention to help
others complete it provided you pay me a royalty."
1948 Hearings, supra note 58, at 16 (statement of Robert W. Byerly). The patentee has no duty
to license others to make and sell a nonstaple used in the patented combination or process.
See Scafetta, supra note 54, at 127; Whale, supra note 52, at 154.
71. Petitioners argued that respondent's refusal to license its competitors to manufacture
and sell propanil distinguished Dawson from Mercoid, because the contributory infringer in
Mercoid refused an offered license. 100 S. Ct. at 2622.
72. Id Compulsory licensing requirements were deleted from the final bill to revise and
codify the patent laws. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 81ST CONG., 2D SESS., PROPOSED
REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF THE PATENT LAWS: PRELIMINARY DRAFT 91 (Comm. Print
1950). But see Arnold and Janicke, Compulsory Licensing ,4nyone, 55 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'v 149
(1973).
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 provides,
purpose.
Finally, the majority reconciled its holding with that of the
Court's prior decisions that followed the Patent Act of 1952. Only
two cases, Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co. 74 and Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co.,75 involved issues of statutory construction under Section 271
that were germane to those raised in Dawson. 76 Both cases con-
strued the doctrine of contributory infringement in light of Section
27 1(c), but in neither case did the Court consider the effect of section
271(d) on patent misuse as espoused in Mercoid. 7
Because there was no Supreme Court guidance prior to Dawson,
lower court attempts to interpret Section 271 (d) yielded inconsistent
and confusing results. 78 Although the Court's statutory construction
was borrowed from the lower courts, 79 Dawson's declaration was
sorely needed to alleviate the confusion created in the lower courts.
The dissenters criticized the majority's construction of Section
271, claiming that the majority found "nothing favoring its position
in the committee reports, the floor debates, or in any materials
Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries ....
Id 35 U.S.C. § 154 provides that the patentee is granted "for the term of seventeen years...
the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention .. " 35 U.S.C. § 154
(1976). See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969).
74. 365 U.S. 336 (1961).
75. 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
76. Other Supreme Court cases have addressed the doctrine of patent misuse, but the
Court was never required to examine Section 271 (d) and its effect on the Mercoid decisions.
100 S. Ct. at 2623. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100
(1969); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
77. 100 S. Ct. at 2623. In Aro 1, 365 U.S. 336 (1961), Justice Whittaker, writing for a
plurality of four justices, stated that a patentee is prohibited from exercising monopoly control
over unpatented elements, regardless of how essential they are to the patented combination.
365 U.S. at 345. Since the Court was dealing only with a question of direct infringement under
Section 271(a), the Court never addressed Section 271 (d). Nevertheless, the Court's language
appeared to resurrect the rule espoused in Mercoid, despite the legislative intent to the con-
trary. See notes 55-67 and accompanying text supra.
In Aro 11, 377 U.S. 476 (1964), the Court ignored the language of Aro I, stating that
"Congress enacted § 271 for the express purpose of reinstating the doctrine of contributory
infringement as it had been developed by decisions prior to Mercoid .... "" Id at 492. Thus,
Aro II reinstated Leeds and Catlin, in which the Court had allowed the patentee to exercise
exclusive control over unpatented nonstaples. See Whale, supra note 52, at 152.
78. See, e.g., Switzer Bros., Inc. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 851 (1962) (followed Aro I in holding that Section 271 did not overrule Mercoid); Dr.
Salsbury's Laboratories v. I.D. Russell Co. Laboratories, 212 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1954), cert.
,denied, 348 U.S. 837 (1954) (failed to differentiate between the staple, dry ice, of Carbice and
the nonstaple, stoker switches, of Mercoid); Sola Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 146 F. Supp.
625 (N.D. Ill. 1956) (held that Section 271(d) had reversed the result in Mercoid).
79. Prior to Dawson, the lower federal courts had found Section 271(d) to protect the
patentee from a charge of misuse in similar fact situations. See, e.g., Robintech, Inc. v.
Chemidus Wavin Ltd., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 873 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Romh and Haas Co. v.
Dawson Chem. Co., 599 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1979); Nordberg Mfg. Co. v. Jackson Vibrators,
Inc., 153 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 777 (N.D. I11. 1967), rev'don other grounds, 393 F.2d 192 (7th Cir.
1968); Sola Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 146 F. Supp. 625 (N.D. Ill. 1956). See note 52
supra.
originating with the legislators who sponsored or managed the
bill."8 Refusing to place any weight on the testimony given in the
legislative hearings, the dissenters emphasized decisions by the
Court since enactment of Section 271 that suggested a wariness to
expand the patent monopoly. 8' Moreover, the dissent stressed that
Rohm and Haas was not insulated from patent misuse merely be-
cause its actions were protected under Section 271(d). Rather, the
dissent claimed that refusing to license others to sell propanil pre-
cluded relief to respondent under Section 271(d). s2 Such a conten-
tion was rebutted, however, by the majority's finding that mandatory
licensing is repugnant to the purpose of the patent grant.8 3 Further-
more, the dissent failed to find any "clear and certain signal" in the
Patent Act that would indicate a Congressional intent to impose
mandatory licensing under the circumstances in Dawson. 84
The opposing views of the majority and the dissent are repre-
sentative of the competing interests involved in the granting of pat-
ent monopolies.
The policy of free competition runs deep in our law. It un-
derlies both the doctrine of patent misuse and the general princi-
ple that the boundary of a patent monopoly is to be limited by the
literal scope of the patent claims. But the policy of stimulating
invention that underlies the entire patent system runs no less deep.
And the doctrine of contributory infringement. . . can be of cru-
cial importance in ensuring that the endeavors and investments of
the inventor do not go unrewarded. 85
While the majority was satisfied that Congress chose to strike a bal-
ance between these competing policy interests,86 the dissent viewed
monopolization of unpatented goods as an extension of the patent
monopoly beyond that contemplated in the Constitution.87 The dis-
sent's hard line against control of unpatented articles, however, is
inconsistent with mandatory licensing, which the dissent condoned
80. 100 S. Ct. at 2633-34. The dissent stated that the Court in the past had been reluctant
to rely on hearing testimony in construing legislative intent. See, e.g., S. & E. Contractors Inc.
v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 13 n.9 (1972). But see Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc. v. Civil
Aeronautics Bd., 336 U.S. 601, 605-06 n.6 (1949); see note 61 supra. Nevertheless, the dissent
did cite a portion of the 1951 Hearings to support a narrow reading of Section 271(d):
Mr. Crumpacker: In other words, all it says is that bringing an action against
someone who is guilty of contributory infringement is not a misuse of the patent.
Mr. Rich:. That is true.
1951 Hearings, supra note 60, at 169 (excerpt does not refer to all of Section 271(d), as the
dissent interpreted it, but only to Section 271(d)(3)).
81. See, e.g., Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972).
82. 100 S. Ct. at 2631. The dissent argued that refusal to licese competitors to sell
propanil was conduct not explicitly excluded from patent misuse by Section 271(d). Id.
83. See notes 70-72 and accompanying text sunpra.
84. The dissent had earlier cited the "clear and certain signal" language from Deepsouth
Packing, 406 U.S. at 531, to support its view that the patent monopoly should not be expanded
by the Court to cover unpatented nonstaples. 100 S. Ct. at 2631.
85. 100 S. Ct. at 2625.
86. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
87. See note 73 supra.
as a remedy in Dawson. The monopoly remains under compulsory
licensing, because extracting royalties from competitors is simply an-
other form of monopoly control.s8
A logical reason does exist for allowing the patentee to control
nonstaples, but not staples, in exploiting a patent. The patent owner
encroaches upon an existing product market whenever the patent
owner attempts to tie unpatented staple articles to the grant of a li-
cense to use the patented invention. 9 Control over nonstaples, how-
ever, affects no existing product market because the only demand for
the nonstaple is generated by the patentee's invention.9" Therefore,
the protections afforded by Sections 271 (c) and 271 (d) may be fleet-
ing; any substantial market demand created by the discovery of a
new use for the nonstaple transforms it into a staple article of com-
merce.
91
The underlying purpose of the patent system is to encourage
invention by rewarding the inventor with a limited monopoly.92 The
protections afforded under Section 271 are particularly beneficial to
the chemical research field, which typically uncovers vast numbers
of new chemical compounds having no immediate known commer-
cial value. Huge investments of both time and money are required
in the research and development of new uses for existing chemicals
having no known practical application.93 Patent protection is avail-
able for the new use,94 but frequently the protection is valueless if
the new use patentee cannot exercise commercial control over the
unpatented, nonstaple chemical used in the patented process. To en-
courage "new use" research, the patent system must provide a mean-
ingful reward for the new use inventor. "Mercoid struck at the heart
of meaningful protection of such inventions, and Section 271 struck
back." 95
In holding that Rohm and Haas' conduct falls within the misuse
exceptions of Section 271(d), the Court avoided an analysis of the
qualifying language of Section 271(d) - provided the patentee is
/"otherwise entitled to relief."96 The Court may rely on this qualifi-
cation to carve out exceptions to Dawson. 9' For the present, how-
88. See Whale, supra note 52, at 156.
89. See note 19 supra.
90. See Whale, supra note 52, at 156.
91. Section 271(c) restricts the doctrine of contributory infringement to nonstaple arti-
cles. Therefore, any staple article having a substantial noninfringing use cannot be the subject
of a suit for contributory infringement under Section 27 1(c). See note 6 supra.
92. See notes 73, 85 and accompanying text supra.
93. 100 S. Ct. at 2626. See generally A. BAINES, F. BRADBURY, AND C. SUCKLING, RE-
SEARCH IN THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 82-163 (1969).
94. See generally Hewitt, The New Use Patent, 51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 634 (1969).
95. Whale, supra note 52, at 159.
96. See note 6 supra.
97. The Dawson Court appeared to rely heavily on a policy of encouraging invention.
See note 85 and accompanying text supra. In Dawson, respondent's method patent could be
ever, Dawson represents a strong public policy of encouraging
invention by finally recognizing the patent enforcement weapons
adopted by Congress in Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952.
profitably exploited only by monopolizing the sale of unpatented propanil. The Court may
reach a different result if other avenues of patent exploitation are available to the patent own-
er.
[Casenote by Thomas A. Miller]
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Preemption Doctrine - The
Field of Banking in Pennsylvania is Preempted by State Regu-
lations. City of Pittsburgh v. Allegheny Valley Bank, - Pa. _
412 A.2d 1366 (1980).
In City of Pittsburgh v. Allegheny Valley Bank,' the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania has preempted all municipal contact with the banking field.
This case presents a rare instance in which the state's regulatory
scheme in a specific field has been found to preempt municipal taxa-
tion within the same field.2
The City of Pittsburgh instituted a Business Privilege Tax3 that
was imposed upon the gross receipts4 of businesses5 at a rate of six
mills.6 The tax was levied upon all "financial business,"7 including
banking. Both federal and state banks in Pittsburgh refused to pay
the tax because they alleged that the tax was invalid as applied to
their industry.' The state banks further alleged that Pennsylvania's
Bank Shares Act9 exempted them from the tax."° Accordingly, the
I. - Pa. - 412 A.2d 1366 (1980).
2. The court's holding precludes all municipal taxation in the field of banking except for
property taxation. Id. at -, n.12, 412 A.2d at 1371 n.12.
3. Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance 675 (December 27, 1968), as amended by Ordinance 594
(December 30, 1970).
4. Pittsburgh Ordinance 675 defines "gross receipts" as "cash, credits, property of any
kind or nature received in or allocable or attributable to the City of Pittsburgh from any busi-
ness." Id § 2.
5. Pittsburgh Ordinance 675 defines "business" as "carrying on or exercising ... within
the City of Pittsburgh any trade, business, including but not limited to financial business." Id
§ 2.
6. Id § 3.
7. Pittsburgh Ordinance 675 defines "financial business" as "the services and transac-
tions of banks and bankers." Id § 2.
8. Federal statutory prohibitions precluded imposing the Business Privilege Tax upon
national banks when the tax was initially levied. See R.S. § 5219; Mar. 4, 1923, c. 267, 42
STAT. 1499; Mar. 25, 1926, c. 88, 44 STAT. 223. Subsequent amendment of the federal statute,
however, exposed the national banks to the tax to the same extent as the state banks. See 12
U.S.C.A. § 548 (1976). Thus, the determination of whether the taxation of state banks is pre-
empted by the state also determines the validity of the tax upon federal banks. Accordingly,
"national" and "state" banks will no longer be distinguished in the text because the court's
holding applies equally to both.
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 7701 to 7706 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
10. Bank Shares Act § 701 provides that "so much of the capital and profits of such bank
and savings institution having capital stock as shall not be invested in real estate, shall be
exempt from local taxation under the laws of this Commonwealth. ... PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
72, § 7701 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
City of Pittsburgh sued in assumpsit to recover the amount of tax
that it claimed was due from the banks.
The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County found the
tax invalid as applied to the "traditional"" activities of the banks,'2
but held that the banks were liable for the Business Privilege Tax as
levied against "nontraditional"' 3 banking activities. 4 On appeal to
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, the lower court's holding
that the tax was invalid upon "traditional" banking activities was
upheld.' 5 The Commonwealth Court, however, found the tax
equally invalid upon "nontraditional" banking activities and, thuts,
the banks were held totally exempt from the Business Privilege
Tax.' 6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the
Business Privilege Tax impermissively impinged upon the state
banking field regardless of the traditional-nontraditional dichotomy
of banking activities."
The foundation ofAlllegheny Valley Bank is the doctrine of state
preemption' 8 of municipal activities as it has evolved in Penn-
sylvania. In Pennsylvania and all other states, municipalities are
considered agents of the state, 9 and within the boundaries of the
constitution,2 ° the state may limit or prohibit taxation and regulation
11. "Traditional" activity is "that business which is suitable only to banks. 123
PUrrs. L.J. 305, 313 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1975).
12. Id at 310.
13. "Nontraditional" activities include, inter alia, the sale of merchandise at a discount to
attract depositors, the sale of insurance, the sale of travel services, and the sale of computer
time. Id at 311-12.
14. Id at 311.
15. 35 Pa. Commw. Ct. 502, 508, 388 A.2d 1098, 1101 (1978).
16. Id at 513, 388 A.2d at 1103.
17. See - Pa. at _ 412 A.2d at 1370. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disposed of the
"traditional"-"nontraditional" dichotomy in two ways. First, the court pronounced the dis-
tinction to be a legal fiction and purely a creation of the trial court. Second, it held that any
activity that the Department of Banking permits banks to enter must be "traditional." The
Department would be otherwise endorsing an ultra vires activity by the bank. Id at - n.10,
412 A.2d at 1370 n.10.
18. "[Plreemption denotes an area of regulation which is open to both local and state
regulation, but which is precluded from local authority." Feiler, Conflict Between State and
Local Enactments - The Doctrine of Implied Presumption, 2 URB. LAW. 398, 404 (1970).
19. In Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534, 49 A. 351 (1901), the state-municipal rela-
tionship was enunciated as follows:
Municipal corporations are agents of the state, invested with certain subordinate
governmental functions for reasons of convenience and public policy. They are cre-
ated, governed, and the extent of their powers determined by the legislature, and
subject to change, repeal, or total abolition at its will. They have not vested rights in
their offices, their charters, their corporate powers, or even their corporate existence.
This is the universal rule of constitutional law, and in no state has it been more
clearly expressed and more uniformly applied than in Pennsylvania.
Id at 541, 49 A. at 352. See Dalzell, The State Preemption Doctrine- Lessons from the Penn-
sylvania Experience, 33 U. PIr. L. REV. 205 (1971). See also Shirk v. Lancaster, 313 Pa. 158,
169 A. 557 (1933); Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169 (1870). See generally I C. ANTIEAu, AN-
TIEAU'S MUNICIPAL LAW § 5.01 (1975); Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1059 (1980).
20. The primary constitutional restraint on the state is the provision for home rule of a
municipality, which does not necessarily preclude state preemption of municipal actions. See
by a municipality.2 Pennsylvania recognizes no inherent powers in
local governments. Municipalities' powers are limited to those ex-
pressly granted, to those necessarily implied by or incident to the
powers expressly granted, and to those indispensable to performance
of a declared object or purpose of the municipality.22 Thus, munici-
pal authority to tax and regulate must be expressly or impliedly per-
mitted by state statute.23 A conflict between state and municipal
action requires a judicial determination of whether the municipality
is permitted to legislate in the area in which the state has acted.24
State action may be so pervasive as to preempt all municipal
incursions into an entire field.25 Unlike express or implied preemp-
tions that eminate from a single statute, field preemption is present
when the entirety of the legislative action in an area evidences a pre-
clusion of local activity.26 The court must, by the very definition of
field preemption,27 examine the extent to which the state has acted
within the area.28 In making this determination, the court will use
either a qualitative or quantitative analysis of the state's actions
within the particular field.29 A qualitative analysis examines the de-
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 31-301 (Purdon 1974). See also Vanlandingham, Home Rule in the
United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REv. 269 (1968).
21. Appeal of Palmer, 307 Pa. 426, 161 A.2d 543 (1932). See also City of New Castle v.
Lawrence County, 353 Pa. 175, 44 A.2d 589 (1945). See Harris-Walsh, Inc. v. Dickson City,
420 Pa. 259, 216 A.2d 329 (1966), in which the court held that Pennsylvania's strip mining
regulations which granted "exclusive jurisdiction" to the Department of Mining expressly pre-
empted stricter mining regulations that were imposed by the local government. The court
refused to challenge the express intent of the legislature. See generally 6 E. MCQUILLAN, THE
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 21.32 (3d ed. 1980).
22. Leslie v. Kite, 192 Pa. 268, 43 A. 959 (1899)(enunciation of Dillon's Rule of permissi-
ble municipal powers as applied in Pennsylvania).
23. "Absent a grant or a delegation of power to tax from the General Assembly, no
municipality. . . has any power or authority to levy, assess or collect taxes." Mastragelo v.
Buckley, 433 Pa. 352, 363, 250 A.2d 447, 452 (1969).
24. The court is placed at the fulcrum of the state-municipal relationship. In instances in
which the state has prescribed regulations for an area, the court must determine the permissi-
bility of supplemental municipal legislation based upon the state legislature's intent. The court
must also ascertain the extent to which the municipal and state actions conflict. Compare
Feiler, Conflict Between State and Local Enactments - The Doctrine of Implied Presumption, 2
URB. LAW. 398 (1970) (the increasing policy role of the court) with Andersen, Resolving
State/Local Governmental Conflicts - A Tale of Three Cities, 18 URB. L. ANN. 129 (1980) (the
ascendance of the legislature due to a presumption for the state in preemption cases).
25. "Field pre-emption occurs when the legislature intends to forbid all classes and types
of municipalities from enacting additional or supplementary legislation on a subject." Com-
ment, Home Rule in Pennsylvania, 81 DICK. L. REv. 265, 280-81 (1977).
26. Glander and Dewey, Municipal Taxation - A Study of the Pre-Emption Doctrine, 9
OHIO ST. L.J. 72 (1948).
27. Because state action must be reviewed to determine if the state has preempted a field,
it would be imprudent to establish a black-letter rule. Nevertheless, the court has not been
shielded from criticisms for failing to enunciate a definitive standard. See, e.g., - Pa. at
412 A.2d at 1372 (Nix, J., dissenting); Dalzell, supra note 19 at 227.
28. In Department of Licenses v. Weber, 394 Pa. 466, 468-69, 147 A.2d 326, 327 (1959),
Justice Musmanno noted that "even if the statute is silent on supersession, but proclaims a
course of regulation and control which brooks no municipal intervention, all ordinances
touching the topic of exclusive control fade away into the limbo of 'innocuous desuetude."'
29. 1 C. ANTIEAU, ANTIEAU'S MUN.ICIPAL LAW § 5.41 (1975).
gree of thoroughness and specificity employed by the state in its reg-
ulation of an area, and is often utilized in reviewing whether the
code governing a field in itself precludes any supplemental or con-
trary municipal actions.3" A quantitative analysis examines the ex-
tent of state action in a field by a composite of state rules,
regulations, and taxes to determine whether, as a whole, they evi-
dence a legislative intent to preempt the field.3
In Hilovsky Liquor License Case, 32 the court employed a quali-
tative analysis to determine whether a municipality may regulate the
sale of liquor with a zoning ordinance. The court found that the
thoroughness and specificity of the Pennsylvania Liquor Code3 3 in-
dicated the legislature's intent to preempt the field of liquor regula-
tion.34 In the recent decision of United Tavern Owners v. Philadelphia
School District," the court first used a qualitative analysis to deter-
mine that the Pennsylvania Liquor Code did not evidence the legis-
lature's intent to preempt a municipal tax upon liquor. The court
then employed a quantitative analysis, and held that the Liquor
Code, two state liquor taxes, and a limitation upon Philadelphia's
taxing power evidenced the legislature's intent to preempt the field.36
The extent of state regulation and taxation in the area indicated the
legislature's intent to preempt the field-37
In Allegheny Valley Bank, both of the lower court decisions
were based upon an express preemption analysis. By enacting the
Local Tax Enabling Act,3 8 the legislature has empowered municipal-
ities to tax any subject in any manner39 that is not in conflict with a
tax or license fee imposed by the state.' The lower courts found that
the Business Privilege Tax was preempted expressly by both the
Bank Shares Tax Act4' and by an assessment upon all banks levied
30. Id
31. Id
32. 379 Pa. 118, 108 A.2d 705 (1954).
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 1-101 (Purdon 1969).
34. The court found that the Liquor Code "constitutes a comprehensive enactment
designed for the complete control and regulation by the state of the dispensing of alcoholic
beverages." 379 Pa. at 121, 108 A.2d at 706.
35. 441 Pa. 274, 272 A.2d 868 (1971). Philadelphia imposed a tax upon the retail sale of
liquor, malt, and brewed beverages in hotels, restaurants, taverns and clubs. The establish-
ment owners challenged the tax claiming the Liquor Code preempted municipal action.
36. Id at 278, 272 A.2d at 870.
37. See Allegheny Valley Bank, - Pa. - 412 A.2d 1366 (1980) (Nix, J., dissenting)
(discusses the quantitative basis for the United Tavern Owners holding). See also Caesar v.
State, - Idaho _ 610 P.2d 517 (1980) (employs the United Tavern Owner rationale).
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6901 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
39. The Local Tax Enabling Act is a successor to the "Tax Anything Act." Seegeneraly
In re Earned Tax Ordinance of City of Wilkes-Barre, 208 Pa. Super. 424, 222 A.2d 499 (1966).
40. The municipality may not tax any "privilege, transaction, subject, occupation or per-
sonal property which is not or does hereafter become subject to a state tax or license fee." PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6902 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7701 (Purdon Supp. 1980). The Bank Shares Tax Act states
that "so much of the capital stock and profits... as shall not be invested in real estate shall be
by the Department of Banking.42 To find that the Bank Shares Tax
Act expressly preempts the local tax, the courts concentrated on de-
termining the nature of the Business Privilege Tax.43 This was una-
voidable in reviewing an ordinance for express preemption because
it must be ascertained whether the specific tax in question is ex-
pressly prohibited by the state.
The Supreme Court took a broader view, finding that the state
had preempted all municipal actions within the field of banking.
Employing a qualitative analysis, the court first examined the legis-
lative action in the banking field and the intent of that action.' The
breadth and particularity of the Banking Code45 and the Banking
Department Code' demonstrated the state's intent to preempt the
field.47  Few areas of regulation are governed by such thorough
codes as the Pennsylvania banking codes. The Banking Code's state-
ment of purpose,48 rules of construction,49 and commentary upon the
provisions of the code5° provide a thorough delineation of the per-
missible practices of banks.5' All phases of the banking industry,
exempt from local taxation under the laws of the Commonwealth." See also City of Oil City
v. Oil City Trust, 151 Pa. 454, 25 A. 124 (1892).
42. The Department of Banking derives its funding from the Bank Shares Tax and a fee
levied against all banks to cover the department's operating costs. The lower courts in Alle-
gheny Valley Bank held the fee to be a licensing fee which preempts the local tax. 35 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 502, 511, 388 A.2d 1098, 1102 (1978); 123 Pitts. L.J. 305, 309-10 (Pa. C.P. Alleg.
1975).
43. See Prudential Ins. v. City of Pittsburgh, 38 Pa. Commw. Ct. 15, 391 A.2d 1326
(1978) (state insurance regulations and taxes do not preempt the Business Privilege Tax). See
generally Busse v. City of Pittsburgh, 443 Pa. 349, 279 A.2d 14 (1971).
44. See Western Pa. Restaurant Ass'n v. City of Pittsburgh, 366 Pa. 374, 77 A.2d 616
(1951), in which Pittsburgh's supplemental health standards were found not to be preempted
by the Commonwealth's less strict standards because the legislative intent to preempt the field
of health regulation was lacking. See also Dalzell, supra note 19, at 280 (concerning the pau-
city of material from which to ascertain legislative intent).
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 101 (Purdon 1967).
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 733-1 (Purdon 1967).
47. Allegheny Valley Bank is consistent with the court's holdings regarding the Banking
Code. In Commercial Banking Corp. v. Freeman, 353 Pa. 563, 46 A.2d 233 (1946), the court
held that the Banking Code applied to any entity engaging in commercial money transactions.
"[Tlhe Banking Code is the complete codification of the laws regulating the business of bank-
ing in this state. . . . [Ilt clearly appears that the fundamental intention of the legislature was
to control the business ... ." Id at 567, 46 A.2d at 235.
The court speaks of "the codes" indicating the legislature's preemptive intent. The use of
the plural is due to the division of the regulatory pronouncements and enforcement provisions.
In other areas where both the regulations and the enforcement provisions are within the same
code, a single code may provide sufficient qualitative indication of the legislature's intent.
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 103 (Purdon 1967). The purpose of the Banking Code is to
insure that the Commonwealth's banking system is competitive, healthy, and secure. As noted
in the comment to Section 103, "The objective is a simplified and modernized legal framework
for maintaining a sound and vital banking system." Id § 103 Comment-Banking Law Com-
mission.
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 104 (Purdon 1967).
50. "The comments of the commission which drafted [the Banking Code] may be con-
sulted in the construction and application of its original provision . PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
7, § 104 (1967).
51. The areas of insurance and liquor have been found on numerous occasions to have
been preempted by the state. E.g., United Tavern Owners v. School District, 441 Pa. 274, 272
including incorporation,52 dissolution,53 investments,54 funds trans-
missions,55 board of director composition,5 6 and dividend distribu-
tions57 are fully detailed and regulated by the code.58 Similarly, the
Banking Department Code greatly details the department's regula-
tory responsibilities for enforcing the Banking Code.5 9
After finding the requisite qualitative elements, the court ex-
amined whether the field was of such statewide importance that it
required uniformity in regulation.6 ° Courts have held that a matter
may have local repercussions that permit the enactment of supple-
mental regulation by municipalities regardless of the state legisla-
ture's intent to preempt a field.6 ' Moreover, other courts have held
that the enforcement of certain state regulations was such an over-
whelming task for the state government that supplemental local ac-
tion was required.62 Contrary to these court decisions, the Allegheny
Valley Bank court determined, consistent with its prior holdings
concerning the banking industry,63 that the state importance of
A.2d 868 (1971) (finding preemption by the Liquor Code). Neither code, however, is nearly as
thorough nor as pronounced as the Banking Code.
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 1001 (Purdon 1967).
53. Id § 1801.
54. Id §6401.
55. Id § 6101.
56. Id § 2001.
57. Id § 1301.
58. Individually, the activities regulated by the Banking Code may appear immaterial.
The totality of the activities regulated by the code, however, demonstrates the concern of the
legislature for the integrity and health of the banking industry. In reviewing other fields for
possible state preemption, the particularity of that area's state regulations is an important fac-
tor.
59. See Stahl v. First Pa., 411 Pa. 121, 191 A.2d 386 (1963) (detailed review by the court
of the Department of Banking's enforcement function). See a/so Delaware County Nat'l Bank
v. Campbell, 378 Pa. 311, 106 A.2d 416 (1954).
60. Statewide importance is a second factor to be considered in analyzing a field to deter-
mine if it has been preempted by the state. A determination that the field is of statewide
concern creates a strong presumption that it has been preempted by the state. See generally
Comment, The Caliornia Preemption Doctrine: Expanding the Regulatory Power ofLocal Gov-
ernments, 8 U.S.F. L. REV. 728 (1974).
61. Brazier v. City of Philadelphia, 215 Pa. 297, 64 A. 508 (1906). The Brazier court held
that Philadelphia's automobile regulations, though stricter than the standards in the state vehi-
cle code, were a permissible supplement to the state requirements because of the peculiar needs
of the urban area. The Brazier holding, which was handed down early in the age of
automobiles, is consistent with the general reluctance of the courts to preempt a field of new
technology, thus limiting municipal regulation. Further, the courts do not want to preclude
municipalities from acting to meet unforeseen local needs arising from new technologies. See
B-C Cable Co., Inc. v. City and Borough of Juneau, No. 4587 (Sup. Ct. Alaska, June 27, 1980)
(no state preemption of the field of cable television regulation).
62. Retail Master Bakers v. Allegheny County, 400 Pa. 1, 161 A.2d 36 (1960). In Retail
Master Bakers, local health regulations were upheld as necessarily supplemental to the state
regulations because the court found no statewide concern which precluded municipal legisla-
tion. See Department of Licenses and Inspections v. Weber, 394 Pa. 466, 147 A.2d 326 (1959),
in which the court held that the barbers' and beauticians' regulations did not require statewide
uniformity and, therefore, local supplemental regulation was permissible. See generally Ford-
ham, Local Government in the Larger Scheme of Things, 8 VAND. L. REV. 667 (1955) (local-
state interest dichotomy examined).
63. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has consistently shielded the Department of
Banking and the banking industry from intervention by other parties. For example, in Penn-
banking did not permit supplemental local regulation.' The court
stated that the economic fate of our Commonwealth is based upon
the health and security of the state banking system.65 Since the total-
ity of the banking system was held to be paramount,66 municipal
interference could not be tolerated in a field that requires equal regu-
lation of all banks in all sections of the Commonwealth,67 particu-
larly in light of the state's strict regulation of the quasi-public
banking industry.68 The greater state interest, rather than the lack of
municipal interest, is determinative in the analysis of statewide uni-
formity.69
The court found an impermissible conflict between the state
banking regulations and the municipal tax by first holding that the
impact of the tax interfered with the Department of Banking's re-
sponsibility of promoting banking within Pennsylvania.7 ° Second,
the court reasoned that a myriad of uncoordinated municipal taxes
upon banking would impair the ability of the Department of Bank-
ing to regulate the banking industry throughout the state. Third, it
was held that the effect of a municipal tax upon a bank was regula-.
tory because its impact could influence local bank policy and prac-
tices, and undermine the regulatory scheme of the Department of
Banking.7' The possibility of regulatory impact upon a preempted
sylvania Bankers Ass'n v. Secretary of Banking, 481 Pa. 332, 382 A.2d 1319 (1978), the court
held that appellate courts should defer to the Department of Banking's findings concerning the
industry. Only when acting beyond the declared purpose of the Banking Code should the
Department of Banking's actions be subject to appellate review. See also Franklin Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Patterson, 421 Pa. 122, 218 A.2d 722 (1966); First Bellefonte Bank & Trust Co. v.
Myers, 409 Pa. 298, 188 A.2d 726 (1963).
64. - Pa. at - 412 A.2d at 1370.
65. Id at _, 412 A.2d at 1369-70.
66. 1d at - 412 A.2d at 1370. Cf. Chester County v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 420 Pa.
427, 218 A.2d 579 (1967) (statewide regulation required for public utilities).
67. "[Tlhe banking system is unique in that the failure of one of several competing insti-
tutions frequently leads not to the enhancement of the relative position of the surviving com-
petitors, but to the possible adverse affects to all." Conestoga Nat'l Bank v. Patterson, 442 Pa.
289, 298, 275 A.2d 6, 11 (1971).
68. Few, if any, industries are as regulated as banks. Public utilities are subject to strin-
gent state review, but are not as dominated by federal regulations. The minutia of the banking
industry, including holidays and hours, are subject to Department of Banking approval. The
basis for the strict regulation is the quasi-public nature of banking and the heavy public reli-
ance on the industry. This policy consideration is an important factor in Allegheny Valley
Bank. See general, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF BANKING, BANK ORGANIZATION AND OPERA-
TION 7-19 (3d ed. 1938).
69. See Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule. A Role for the
Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1964). Cf. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1059 (1980) (presumption exists in favor of state because of belief that city is inefficient).
70. The "promotional" role of the Department of Banking is another indication of the
special treatment accorded the banking industry. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 103(a) (Purdon
1967).
7 1. The view that a municipal tax upon a bank is regulatory is drawn directly from Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). "Tlhe power to tax involves the power to
destroy;. . . the power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create." Id at
431.
No municipal tax affecting an area of state regulation will be secure against the threat of
state preemption. The possibility of regulation by a local tax exposes the tax to invalidation
field, therefore, was held to be sufficient to render the municipal tax
a nullity in that field.72
In holding that the Pittsburgh Business Privilege Tax was pre-
empted by the Banking Code and the Department of Banking Code,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for the first time found a munic-
ipal tax to be preempted by state regulations.7 3 The preemption of a
municipal tax because of state taxation in a field is not uncommon.74
Likewise, numerous state regulatory schemes have been found to be
so extensive that they manifested a legislative intent to prohibit mu-
nicipal regulatory schemes.75 The Supreme Court has now ex-
panded the use of the preemption doctrine by finding an
impermissible conflict between state regulations and a municipal tax.
Allegheny Valley Bank places the banking industry beyond all
but the most basic contact with municipalities. All municipal regula-
tions and taxes that affect banks are suspect for their possible inter-
ference with the state's regulatory scheme. Beyond the immediate
impact of the holding, Allegheny Valley Bank provides a framework
for analyzing questions of preemption. Sufficient qualitative or
quantitative indication of the legislature's intent to preempt the field
and the statewide importance of the field in question are requisite
elements in all field preemption cases. The court additionally ex-
panded Pennsylvania's preemption doctrine to hold that taxation by
a municipality in a field of exclusive state regulation may be pre-
empted because of the possibility of adverse interference with the
Commonwealth's regulatory scheme. Future field preemption chal-
lenges must clear these standards set by the court.
wherever it contacts an area of complete state regulatory control. The tax in Allegheny Valley
Bank was not speciously applied to banks, but was levied upon all businesses. The breadth of
a tax's application is of little, if any, importance in considering the possible interference with
state regulation. See Parker v. City of Silverton, 109 Or. 298, 220 P. 139 (1923) (Oregon's
preemption of a municipal tax predicated upon the state's regulatory preemption of the field).
72. The possibility of regulatory impact rendering a municipal tax a nullity appears to
threaten any municipal action, such as a zoning regulation, that may be a means to a regula-
tory end. If a field is found to be preempted by the state, subsequent municipal contact with
the field must be scrutinized for possible regulatory impact upon the field. A problem may
arise if a bank is authorized by the Department of Banking to establish a branch at a specific
location. If that location is suburban and residential, lacking banking facilities in the immedi-
ate area, municipal zoning may have an improper regulatory affect upon the promotion of
banking within the Commonwealth.
73. See - Pa. - - 412 A.2d 1366, 1373 (1980) (Nix, J., dissenting).
74. Dalzell, supra note 19, at 212. See also Prudential Ins. v. City of Pittsburgh, 38 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 15, 391 A.2d 1326 (1978).
75. Regulatory preemption is the most frequent type of preemption question, and is often
at issue in the lower courts. See, e.g., Schneck v. City of Pittsburgh, 34 Pa. Commw. Ct. 96,
383 A.2d 227 (1978) (state preemption of gun regulations); Fantastic Plastic, Inc. v. City of
Pittsburgh, 32 Pa. Commw. Ct. 41, 377 A.2d 1051 (1977) (Liquor Code preempts municipal
regulations with substantial impact on liquor field); Knauer v. Commonwealth, 17 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 360, 332 A.2d 589 (1975) (state preemption of picketing regulations).
[Casenote by Douglas B. Marcellol
